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Abstract: The text is treats of the espionage against Poland in the period 1944–1989. 
The above analysis has been supplemented with the quantitative data from the period 
1944–1984 as regards those convicted for participating in, acting for, and passing on 
information to the foreign intelligence agencies. The espionage issues were presented 
on the example of the American intelligence activity, which was illustrated by the 
cases of persons who were convicted for espionage. While examining the research 
thesis, the author used the documents and analyses prepared by the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs, which were in its major part addressed to the Security Service and the 
Citizens’ Militia officers. The author made an attempt at the verification of the fol-
lowing research hypotheses: (1) To what extent did the character of the socio-political 
system influence the number of persons convicted for espionage against Poland in 
the period under examination (1944–1989)?; (2) What was the level of foreign intel-
ligence services’ interest in Poland before the year 1990?; (3) Is it possible to indicate 
the specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland?
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Introduction
The aim of this text is to present the level of knowledge among the au-thorities responsible for the state security and public order about the 
intelligence activities conducted against Poland in the period 1944–1989. 
The above issues will be examined against the backdrop of the U.S. es-
pionage. An attempt at the reconstruction of knowledge in this area of 
interest will be based on an analysis of selected training materials and 
other documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Additionally, the 
above analysis will be supplemented with the quantitative data from the 
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period 1944–1984 as regards those convicted for participating in, acting 
for, and passing on information to foreign intelligence agencies. Specific 
problems related to the U.S. intelligence activity will be supported with 
examples illustrating the acts of espionage targeted against Poland.
The analysis though will not cover the legal framework for the opera-
tion of the Polish special services in the era of the People’s Republic of 
Poland (Polska Republika Ludowa, PRL), nor the historical outline of 
counter-intelligence and intelligence services in Poland. Moreover, the 
text will not examine the techniques of invigilation, or the specificity of 
operational activity in intelligence services.
It should be noted here that a great number of reports prepared by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of National Defence were de-
stroyed during the political transition process at the turn of 1989 and 1990; 
however, it should not be associated solely with the destruction of records 
describing the processes of acquiring agents internally or abroad by the 
Polish special services in the PRL era (e.g. the documentation on training 
the candidates for informants or agents’ recruitment). Thus, this analysis 
will be limited in terms of the quantitative data related to the persons con-
victed in Poland for espionage and the information on these issues included 
in the training materials prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the 
officers of the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Służba 
Bezpieczeństwa, SB) and the Citizens’ Militia (Milicja Obywatelska, MO).
As regards the subject matter of this analysis and the aim of the re-
search, the following questions have been raised: (1) To what extent did 
the character of the socio-political system influence the number of persons 
convicted for espionage against Poland in the period under examination 
(1944–1989)?; (2) What was the level of foreign intelligence services’ 
interest in Poland before the year 1990?; (3) Is it possible to indicate the 
specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland?
Research methodology used in the analysis of the sources
The access to the training materials prepared by the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs for the officers of the Security Service was possible thanks 
to the prior studies of the issues of information security held on our own. 
The analysis of selected documents was supplemented with open inter-
views with former Security Service officers. However, the above men-
tioned open interview should be classified as an example of “oral history” 
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in its broadest meaning; it was carried out solely to reproduce the aware-
ness and the mindset in the area of conducted research (including the 
perception of the training materials prepared by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs for the Security Service officers during their work before 1990). 
This interview helped to take a critical stance on the ideological content 
of these materials as well as on the practices of the Security Service offic-
ers – it did not constitute a matter for detailed presentation in the text.
The analysis was mainly based on the training materials prepared by 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which are listed in the References. What 
should be taken into account is the type of the documents whose charac-
teristic features (e.g. the date of issue, authorship, title of the publication) 
might be missing by author’s discretion. The lack of basic “biographi-
cal elements” follows from the fact that the author of the text had ac-
cess only to the documents which were destroyed partially by the officers 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs themselves – it is then plausible that 
there exist the same documents with full “biographical data” coverage. 
A potential source of such documentation might constitute the archives 
of the Institute of National Remembrance, whose aim is to: (1) handle 
the documents by the Communist State Security Bodies (1944–1989), 
(2) prosecute the communist and Nazi crimes, (3) organise educational 
activities. Of paramount importance is here the Office for the Preserva-
tion and Dissemination of Archival Records – it collects, keeps, secures, 
elaborates on, records, and makes documents available.
What should be considered then is the credibility of the documents 
prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the same holds true for the 
analysis of convictions for espionage. Certainly, the training materials 
prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs were influenced by the ideol-
ogy of the then political system and its specificity. As an example here 
may serve the materials referring to the possible German revisionism as 
regards Poland’s western border. In the case of criminal judgements for 
espionage there could have been convictions for espionage which, con-
sidering present legislation and judicature, would never have taken place. 
Undoubtedly, it remains an open question whether the authenticity of the 
documents prepared by the apparatus of the socialist state’s repression 
could be trusted (Brzechczyn, 2012, pp. 53–77). Analysing the documents 
from the PRL era one should act wisely and moderately; in methodology 
one should pay their attention to the fact that two paradigms, i.e. narra-
tivism and positivism, are not devoid of drawbacks (Brzechczyn, 2013, 
pp. 513–518; Brzechczyn, 2006, pp. 37–53).
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Overall analysis of the intelligence activity against Poland 
(1944–1989)
In the period 1944–1984, the number of convicts for espionage against 
Poland exceeded 2160 persons; however, it should be stressed that we 
are talking about the statistics concerned with convictions and not with 
the established cases of espionage either for foreign intelligence services 
or on behalf of the so-called “Western reactionary centres” (Cf. Figure 
1) (Informant, 1986). The sheer fact of establishing an act of espionage 
and convicting for espionage to some extent marks a defeat of particular 
services, as it means that those persons could not be recruited or used as 
“reversed agents”. However, it can be assumed that in some cases the 
security bodies were not interested in acquiring new agents, as the elimi-
nation of possible threats to the State’s security and public order was con-
sidered as more important. Also, the figures provided by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs in the period in question are controversial, which can be 
derived from the following facts: (1) the lack of detectability of espionage 
crimes against Poland, as well as (2) the possibility of acquiring the un-
masked agents to fight against the intelligence services for which they had 
previously worked. Moreover, the quantitative data point to the fact that 
the number of convictions in the 1940s and ‘50s was overrepresented. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that an important factor leading 
to this misinterpretation of the quantitative data is the belief among the 
researchers themselves that the number of “real” spies in the period in 
question could amount to 350–400 persons (Piecuch, 1996, pp. 406–407), 
although one should rather support the view that the number of “real” 
spies was smaller, but it is hard to prove, as it is impossible to provide 
the exact data. Such data could be obtained only after the analysis of the 
materials from the trials of particular persons.
The greatest number of spies convicted in the period 1944–1984 
worked for the USA (33.2%), the UK (19.9%), France (10.1%), West Ger-
many (9.5%), Sweden (0.7%), and for the so-called “western reactionary 
centres” (21.3%). The remaining cases, i.e. more than 5%, referred to the 
instances of espionage for other countries. What deserves our attention is 
the number of convictions for espionage in the period 1946–1956, which 
reached nearly 82%.1
1 Own calculations based on the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 
1986.
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Then what was the phenomenon of the period 1946–1956? In the first 
place, it is the peculiar political situation of all countries that fell un-
der the influence of the USSR. By 1953, they had been left with strong 
imprint of Stalin’s ideology. In 1946 the USSR, faced with serious eco-
nomic underdevelopment, embarked on another 5-year plan; the society 
was subjected to increased control mechanisms and to another wave of 
ideological indoctrination. The model of Stalin’s state was reproduced 
in the so-called people’s democracies, i.e. countries that had become de-
pendent on the USSR, including Poland (Czubiński 1998, pp. 260–270). 
Internal policy was also influenced by external factors, such as the “Cold 
War” or Poland’s political structures operating in exile. Moreover, in this 
period the communist authorities were still engaged in the fight against 
the underground independence movement (e.g. Polish underground anti-
communist organisation Freedom and Independence or the Ukrainian In-
surgent Army). There was also an urgent need for effective mechanisms 
guaranteeing the successful introduction of socio-economic reforms, e.g. 
the agricultural reform (Cf. Łuczak, 2011, pp. 53–58; Jakimek-Zapart, 
2008, pp. 95–103). Another factor could be the specificity of the practice 
of the security bodies and courts as well as the specific legal situation 
ensuing from the prolonged application of the Polish Armed Forces Penal 
Code.
Moreover, of big importance was the development of security agen-
cies in Poland, which remained under the direct influence of the USSR 
for a long time (int. al. through the supervision executed by the Soviet 
advisors). The Polish security apparatus was of the Soviet pedigree – the 
Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publiczne-
go) was established in 1945 and thus replaced the Department of Public 
Security (Resort Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego), which had been formed 
under the auspices of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (the 
“puppet” government set up de facto in Moscow in July, 1944).
Beginning with the year 1945, Poland witnessed an intensified devel-
opment of the security apparatus, inter alia through the establishment of 
regional units – the Voivodeship Offices of Public Security (Wojewódz-
kie Urzędy Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego). During the years of Stanisław 
Radkiewicz’s term (1944/1945–1954), the Department set up 14 Voivode-
ship Offices of Public Security and over 200 poviat units. Moreover, the 
security apparatus included: the Polish People’s Army (Ludowe Wojsko 
Polskie), under the command of the Marshal of Poland and USSR, the 
Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland and the People’s 
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Republic of Poland Konstanty K. Rokossowski; the Border Protection 
Troops (Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza), whose first Commander-in-Chief 
was G. Czerwiński – major general of the Soviet Army, brigadier general 
of the Polish Armed Forces, who returned to the USSR in 1947; the Inter-
nal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego), which was 
operating in the period 1945–1965 and whose aim was to fight against the 
Polish underground independence movement as well as the Ukrainian and 
German military organisations; the Citizens’ Militia (Milicja Obywatel-
ska), which was operating in the years 1944–1990; and the Volunteer 
Reserve Militia (Ochotnicza Rezerwa Milicji Obywatelskiej, ORMO), 
which operated during the period 1946–1989 (Królikowski, 2010; Proch-
wicz, 1995; Paczkowski, 1993, pp. 1–9; Paczkowski, 1992a, pp. 3–7; 
Paczkowski, 1992b, pp. 378–383).
Along the political changes within the communist system, there were 
introduced other reforms of the security apparatus. And thus, in 1956, the 
Department of Security (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, UB) was transformed 
into the Security Service, which remained under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. It is impossible to analyse here all the chang-
es (these can be found in the synthetic studies by the Institute of National 
Remembrance); however, it is worth mentioning that while analysing es-
pionage, particular divisions/departments of the Security Service ap-
pear as highly important: No. 1 – intelligence, No. 2 – counter-intel-
ligence, No. 3 – intended to fight against any subversive activity on 
the territory of Poland (Apparatus, 2005, pp. 19–75; Apparatus, 2006, 
pp. 7–31; Apparatus, 2008, pp. 9–59; Faces, 2010, pp. 11–32). Moreo-
ver, the problem of espionage was handled by armed special services: 
(1) established in 1957, the Military Internal Service at the Ministry of 
National Defence (Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna Ministerstwa Obrony 
Narodowej) replaced the Main Directorate of Information of the Polish 
Army (Główny Zarząd Informacji Wojska Polskiego) as a military coun-
ter-espionage organ, (2) the Board of the 2nd Division of the General 
Staff of the Polish Armed Forces as a military intelligence organ (Koj, 
2007, pp. 80–87).
To illustrate the point, the scope of responsibilities of the officers from 
the 2nd Division of the Security Service included: (1) organisation and 
implementation of counter-intelligence (prevention and detection of es-
pionage and diversion activity), (2) operational supervision over various 
facilities and communities, (3) work with informants (including the or-
ganisation of contact points), (4) systematic reconnaissance of the com-
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munities related to the foreigners, (5) co-operation with passport control 
points in order to conduct counter-espionage selection (persons arriving 
in and leaving PRL), (6) operational safeguard of the foreigners stay-
ing in Poland, (7) flow of information on the protected facilities of key 
importance for the security issues (including the military complex of the 
People’s Army and the Soviet Army). The interviews with former Secu-
rity Service officers revealed that at the lowest level (the Regional Offices 
of Internal Affairs) a great number of operational actions (e.g. the control 
over strategic facilities) were feigned, which was due to the fact that the 
officers had to report to their superiors and show their competence. In the 
1980s, in the PRL era, it was hardly possible to Report multiple instances 
of counter-espionage threats at the level of communes [Pol. administra-
tive units of ‘gmina’], hence the Security Service officers fabricated sto-
ries about feigned threats (this phenomenon should be taken into account 
in the analysis of the operational documents of these services).2
An analysis of intelligence activity as illustrated by the case  
of the USA
Most importantly, it should be noted that of all Western countries, it 
was the USA that disposed of the largest intelligence capacity, which is 
why many pointed to the “massive” character of U.S. intelligence activ-
ity. The training materials prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
confirm that in the area of intelligence activity it is the NATO countries, 
with the USA in the lead, which were the most active diplomacies in 
this respect. The American intelligence was treated as “the main tool of 
politics in the imperial circles, which opposed the policy of détente on the 
international stage” (Immunities, pp. 19–21; Certain features). The main 
examples usually given to illustrate the point and prove the existence of 
activities threatening the international security and the security of particu-
lar countries include the interventions in Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, and Latin 
America (Certain features).
Moreover, the American intelligence service was believed to actively 
operate in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and West Berlin.3 Ob-
2 Synthesis of tasks based on the open interview with the former Security service 
officers.
3 Until the ratification of the Treaty of Warsaw (on the normalisation of relations 
between the People’s Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany) in 
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viously, the sheer fact of the presence of the Americans in the Federal 
Republic of Germany ensued from the introduction of allied-occupied 
zones in this region in the 1940s. However, the American activity in the 
following years was related to the establishment on the German territory 
of a quasi operational centre (a kind of a “starting point” for intelligence 
activities) against the socialist states. According to the archives of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the period between 1940s and 1960s, on 
the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, there were operating 
over three hundred intelligence units. As regards the activity of the Amer-
ican intelligence services in Poland, there are available the quantitative 
data, presented in this text.
What should be pointed out is the common practice of getaways from 
the communist Poland to the Federal Republic of Germany. Those who 
managed to reach the FRG, or directly the West Berlin, stayed for a while 
in the refugee camps, which were controlled by the intelligence services 
of the Western countries. As an example here may serve an escape of 
Augustyn D. who, after reaching the Federal Republic of Germany, was 
allegedly interrogated by the British, French, and finally the American 
intelligence services, to be subsequently recruited by the latter. Follow-
ing his recruitment, Augustyn D. was to be trained in the area of drawing 
sketches and detecting the troops of the Polish Armed Forces and the 
Soviet Army. Augustyn D. was captured, while he was crossing the FRG-
GDR (German Democratic Republic) border in 1960, and, subsequently, 
was sentenced to five years in prison beginning with 1961 (Materials, 
No. 6007/III). Similar was the case of Edward A., who joined the “Valka” 
refugee camp in Nuremberg. In 1955, Edward A. agreed to co-operate 
with the American intelligence service, which resulted in his attempt to 
cross the FRG-GDR border, organise a spy ring and gather military in-
formation. He was arrested by the GDR border guards and handed over 
to the Polish authorities, who sentenced him to 13 years of imprisonment 
(Materials, No. 6830/II). Another example is Aleksander A., who was an 
officer on vessels flying the FRG and Swedish flags in 1960s and ‘70s. 
In 1963, Aleksander A. stayed in the “Camp Cing” refugee camp near 
Oberursel in FRG. During his stay in the camp, he allegedly passed on, 
to two American intelligence officers, information on military facilities, 
including the location of a torpedo platform. Aleksander A. was charged 
1970, Poland officially used the name of the German Federal Republic (Niemiecka 
Republika Federalna, NRF) when referring to the German state.
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with espionage and sentenced to 6 years in prison in 1975 (Materials, 
No. 15429/II; Materials, No. 7838/III).
Most naturally, the Polish counter-intelligence service was interested 
in diplomatic posts of the Western countries. It was clear that all diplo-
matic posts of the capitalist countries gathered information on the socio-
political situation, including the defence issues (Immunities, pp. 12–22). 
Polish citizens themselves were a natural source of information, hence 
a key role in intelligence activity against Poland was played by personal 
contacts or attempts at establishing such contacts by diplomats. The ac-
tivity of persons gathering information on the military issues (the state 
defence, the functioning of the Warsaw Pact, new military technologies, 
rocket stations, military training areas, the Soviet Army troops) was re-
garded as the most detrimental. In the case of diplomatic posts, this kind 
of information fell in the area of interest of military attachés and certain 
civil diplomats, some of which were full-time intelligence service agents 
(Immunities, pp. 12–21; Certain features, pp. 33–34). Passing on infor-
mation and co-operation was also possible in diplomatic posts outside Po-
land, which was the case of Gerard B., who as an employer of the Polish 
Ocean Lines turned to the U.S. embassy in Rotterdam, offering his intel-
ligence services. Gerard B. gathered and passed on military information 
from the territory of Poland, the People’s Republic of China, the People’s 
Republic of Korea, and Hungary to the U.S. embassy in Rotterdam, for 
which he was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in 1968 (Materials, 
No. 11371/II).
The most famous case of recruitment outside Poland was that of Rys-
zard J. Kukliński. According to Kukliński’s account, his recruitment be-
gan with his letter to the military attaché at the U.S. embassy in Bonn, 
which led to his meeting with the American special services in the Hague, 
in 1972. The issue of the place of recruitment is also disputable, as it 
is believed that Kukliński could have been recruited by the Americans 
during the period 1967–1968, when he served in the International Com-
mission for Supervision and Control over the Geneva Accords in Viet-
nam. Some speculate that Kukliński, who was supported by the Soviet 
officers in terms of his military career in Poland, was manipulated by the 
GRU in their operational game (Walenciak, 2014). It is estimated that 
since the beginning of the 1970s till the beginning of the 1980s Kukliński 
passed on to the Americans circa 35,000 documents, mainly the strate-
gic plans and organisational documents of the Warsaw Pact, including 
the documents on Poland’s defence during the conflict with the West-
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ern bloc. The range of topics covered in the documents passed on to the 
Americans is still thoroughly analysed and widely discussed (Puchała, 
2012, pp. 164–184; Nurowska, 2004). Irrespective of any ethical evalu-
ation of Kukliński’s doings, due to his espionage activity it was not only 
the security and the defence of PRL at stake, but also the security of the 
whole Polish society, should any military confrontation with the NATO 
states have occurred. By the judgment of the Military Chamber of the 
Supreme Court of 23 May 1984 Kukliński was sentenced in absentia to 
death, deprived of public rights for a lifetime, whereas his property was 
subjected to total confiscation. Kukliński was convicted for high treason 
in accordance with Article 122 of the then Penal Code (pursuant to the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland, Art. 93, Item 2, it was 
the greatest crime committed against the State). It is worth emphasising 
that Kukliński was a Colonel of the Polish Armed Forces and a Head of 
the Strategy and Defence Planning Division of the General Staff of the 
Polish Army. In 1995, partially thanks to the USA that exerted pressure 
on Poland in relation to the procedure of accession into the structures 
of NATO, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of 1984 and the 
case was submitted for reconsideration by the prosecution of the Warsaw 
Military District. Later on, Kukliński was rehabilitated as an officer of 
the Polish Armed Forces. The justification for the discontinuation of the 
proceedings is secret – the grounds for it might have been the “state of 
higher necessity”; however, Kukliński’s defender pleaded that the crime, 
in line with Article 122 of the then Penal Code, is not presently penalised 
(Krajewski, 2014, pp. 134–136).
There were other instances of getaways of the PRL apparatus’ officers, 
one of which was the case of Władysław Tykociński (aka Tykotzinor), 
who deserted in 1965 (being at the time the Head of the PRL Military 
Mission in the West Berlin, the Minister Plenipotentiary, the Colonel of 
the Polish Armed Forces, and till 1944 the soldier of the Red Army). After 
his escape, he was stationed at the “Camp Cing” refugee camp, where 
he was interrogated by the CIA officers. The information he passed on 
enabled the FRG authorities to charge other persons for their intelligence 
activity. By the Military Court judgment he was sentenced in absentia to 
death in 1966 (Materials, No. 6399/III). He died in circumstances that 
were never clarified in the USA, two years after his getaway.
It is worth mentioning that apart from the cases of Kukliński and 
Tykociński there were other instances of getaways and espionage among 
military officers. Five colonels of the Polish Army escaped from Poland, 
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who (apart from the above two) were as follows: Paweł Monat (the of-
ficer at the Board of the 2nd Division of the General Staff of the Polish 
Armed Forces, the head of the Military Attachés Department, a former 
soldier of the Red Army), Klemens Nussbaum (the deputy head of the 
military studies department at the Warsaw University of Technology), and 
Włodzimierz Ostaszewicz (the head of the Office of the Plenipotentiary of 
the General Staff for Special Affairs). Poland also witnessed getaways of 
two generals (Izydor Modelski and Leon Dubicki) and several dozens of 
other military officers. In total, in the period 1944–1990, 61 military of-
ficers escaped to different countries, including pilots who hijacked planes 
(Pióro, 1999, pp. 124–139).
A valuable source of information for the USA was P. Monat, who had 
a thorough knowledge of the Polish intelligence service as well as a great 
familiarity with the Party apparatchiks – his wife was an adopted daugh-
ter of A. Zawadzki (the Chairman of the Council of State of the Republic 
of Poland). P. Monat escaped in 1959 during his work leave in Yugosla-
via. On his journey, he met with the Czech military attaché, F. Tisler, 
who also escaped to the USA; it is assumed that they had co-operated for 
a long time with the U.S. intelligence service (Pióro, 1999, pp. 124–139; 
Dulles, 2006, pp. 137–139). P. Monat was sentenced in absentia to death 
for high treason and deprived of public and honorary civil rights for a life-
time (Materials, No. ZS-3977).
Another person who used his trip to Yugoslavia to organise his geta-
way was K. Nussbaum; he escaped with his family in 1968. He travelled 
through Italy and his ultimate destination was Israel. The case of K. Nuss-
baum was significant, as his wife Stanisława Zawadecka-Nussbaum was 
a PRL Sejm deputy and the Secretary of the National Unity Front (i.e. the 
coalition of the three legal communist parties). However, in this particu-
lar case there is no vital information on their co-operation with the USA 
(Pióro, 1999, pp. 124–139).
Another colonel who fled during his stay abroad was W. Ostaszewicz. 
His escape took place during his apparent holiday sojourn in Yugoslavia 
and Greece, where he was supposed to stay with his family in 1981; in-
stead, he made a breakthrough from Austria to Great Britain and finally 
landed in Canada. By the Military Court judgment Ostaszewicz was sen-
tenced to death, deprived of public rights for a lifetime, and his property 
was subject to confiscation (Catalogue, 2014). It should be noted that 
while Włodzimierz Ostaszewicz fled in September 1981, his son, Marek 
(a consular attaché at the Consulate-General in Toronto) was charged 
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with passing on classified information constituting a State Secret to the 
Canadian and American special services, in October 1981. By the Mili-
tary Court judgment Marek Ostaszewicz was sentenced in absentia for 
espionage to 15 years of imprisonment and 8 years of the deprivation of 
public rights (Materials, No. 7385/III). Moreover, in relation to the case 
of R. J. Kukliński, two facts remain controversial: (1) it was Włodzimierz 
Ostaszewicz who recommended Kukliński for his mission in Vietnam, 
towards the end of 1960s; (2) Włodzimierz Ostaszewicz and Ryszard 
Kukliński used to be neighbours, when they lived in Warsaw.
Also, members of the staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs made attempts at instigating co-operation with 
the USA. Janusz Kochański might serve as an illustration of the point; he 
used his diplomatic passport to reach Copenhagen, from where he refused 
to return to his country. Subsequently, he went to the USA. Kochański is 
an interesting case, as he was a member of the staff of the First Depart-
ment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (intelligence), the director of the 
Department of Polish Diaspora at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well 
as the resident of the intelligence service in Stockholm and Oslo. By the 
Military Court judgment he was sentenced in absentia to death in 1968 
(Materials, No. 4063/III; Pawlikowicz, 2004).
Another noteworthy case is that of Bogdan Walewski, who worked for 
the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of Poland to the United 
Nations in New York. According to the information of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, he co-operated with the American intelligence service 
in the years 1959–1981. He was recruited by the Canadians on behalf of 
the U.S. intelligence. However, it should be noted that in 1954 he was 
recruited by the KGB during his studies at the Institute of International 
Relations in Moscow. Most probably, his recruitment for the USA in Vi-
etnam was part of his task commissioned by the KGB. He performed 
crucial diplomatic functions – he was the Chief of the Diplomatic Proto-
col, the vice-Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the 
First Secretary of the Polish Embassy in Moscow, the Head of the Im-
munities and Privileges Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
By the Military Court judgment of 1982 he was sentenced to 25 years of 
imprisonment, 10 years of deprivation of public rights and a fine. In 1985, 
in Berlin, Walewski was exchanged for the Polish agent, M. Zacharski 
(Materials, No. 7434/III).
It should also be mentioned that there were instances of Polish citizens 
who contacted various diplomatic posts on the territory of Poland. Such 
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was the case of Andrzej B., who went to the U.S. embassy in Warsaw in 
1978. In 1979, he was sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment for the co-
operation with foreign intelligence services, which consisted in passing 
on the information on the defence of the People’s Republic of Poland 
(Materials, No. ZS-4502).
In general, the diplomats of Western countries in Poland were granted 
freedom of movement, with the obvious exception of the so-called “closed 
areas”, e.g. the military training grounds. However, it should be empha-
sised that in response to the decision of the U.S. government of 1963 in-
troducing restricted areas for the Polish diplomats in Washington as well 
as for the Polish consulate staff in Chicago and the representatives to the 
United Nations, the Polish government too prohibited the passage of the 
American diplomats to certain areas in Poland (Immunities, pp. 12–21). 
The instructions for the officers of the uniformed and special services of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs pointed to the necessity of counteracting 
the attempts made by foreign diplomats to enter the restricted industrial 
facilities and the secured premises as well as of preventing the persons 
with diplomatic immunities and privileges from making photos (Gliński, 
1958, pp. 131–132). Moreover, what was pointed out was the necessity of 
the Citizens’ Militia’s co-operation with the Security Service as regards 
gathering information on the arrival of each and every foreigner and, in 
particular, on the activities undertaken by the diplomats, inter alia on 
the presence of diplomatic corps vehicles in certain areas (Cf. Immuni-
ties, pp. 22–33; Letter, 1963; Order no. 8/57, 1957). A statutory registra-
tion requirement was an effective mechanism of controlling foreigners; it 
stated that a foreigner had to register within 24 hours from their arrival in 
Poland and, in addition, they had to inform the competent authorities of 
each and every change in their place of residence (holders of immunities 
or diplomatic privileges were exempted from this obligation) (Uldano-
wicz, 1960, pp. 112–115).
According to the analyses of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the U.S. 
embassy in Warsaw sheltered the permanent residency of the American 
intelligence service. The residency was to mirror the significance of par-
ticular special services in the USA, and thus it was speculated that the 
embassy covered for the representatives of the CIA (Central Intelligence 
Agency), the DIA (Defence Intelligence Agency), the NSA (National Se-
curity Agency), the INR (State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search), and other institutions (Affet, 1978; Pleskot, 2013a, pp. 332–340). 
However, the greatest merit was ascribed to the CIA, which was due to its 
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institutional backing in the USA – the CIA was the secret service which 
co-ordinated the operations of all intelligence agencies (Pleskot, 2013a, 
p. 335).
It was mentioned earlier that the presence of the Americans in FRG 
was vital for the Polish counter-intelligence. It follows from the fact that 
a great number of agents captured and sentenced for espionage on behalf 
of the USA were trained in the training centre in Frankfurt am Main. Ac-
cording to the training materials of the Security Service, Frankfurt am 
Main was considered to be the regional centre (or branch) of the CIA, 
which was to co-ordinate specific residencies in the region, including the 
territory of Poland, the West Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart, and 
Vienna (Pleskot, 2013a, p. 336). However, after the analysis of the quan-
titative data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as regards the convictions 
for espionage in the period 1944–1984, it becomes clear that part of the 
Polish citizens recruited on the territory of FRG went through the training 
procedures not only in Frankfurt am Main, but also in other centres, e.g. 
the West Berlin. Thus, the West Berlin was the area of possible organ-
ised intelligence operations targeted at the encouragement of the Polish 
citizens to co-operate, which in turn constituted an area of interest for 
the Polish intelligence and counter-intelligence services. The West Berlin 
was also a destination point of the Polish citizens’ getaways, which con-
stituted a natural source of agents’ recruitment.
According to the data of 1988, the residency in the U.S. embassy in 
Warsaw consisted of 32 staff members, which constituted 55% of the 
whole embassy’s operational personnel. The staff workers and the official 
civil services employees amounted to 17 persons in total. The residency 
had its representatives in the culture and press division as well as in the 
economic, political, and consular departments. The military officers of 
the special services joined the ranks of the military attachés, the telecom-
munications, political, and economic divisions as well as the science and 
technology department. A group of residents was supported by persons 
who arrived in the embassy for short sojourns (Information, 1988).
The Ministry of Internal Affairs differentiated 6 directions in the activ-
ity of the embassy’s residency: (1) defence, (2) political issues (the func-
tioning of the PRL apparatus), (3) the activity of the political opposition, 
(4) the economy, (5) Poland’s inter-allied relations, (6) the activity of the 
Church in Poland (Information, 1988).
It is obvious that it was in line with its counter-espionage activity that 
the 2nd Division of the Security Service attempted to acquire foreign dip-
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lomats for co-operation. However, the materials of the Security Service 
on their activity targeted at the recruitment of a diplomat-mole are in-
finitesimal as compared to the documents on other types of recruitment 
(Pleskot, 2013a, pp. 194–202). It might be the result of: (1) the poor ef-
fectiveness of the Security Service, (2) a possible destruction of opera-
tional files and/or thematic files on the recruited diplomats and unmasked 
diplomatic posts, (3) the fact that these diplomats were handed over to the 
USSR special services residing on the territory of Poland.
As regards the first case, it might have ensued from the overall dif-
ficulty with the recruitment in the diplomatic circles. A frequent tool 
that facilitated recruitment was concocting a provocation. Also, it was 
not necessary to get through to diplomats directly; it was a common 
practice to engage the prostitutes co-operating with the Security Serv-
ice, who gathered information indirectly. For instance, it is assumed 
that the “B” Division of the Security Service performed its operational 
techniques in hotels of higher standard, i.e. where foreigners were likely 
to stay.
The second case might be backed by open interviews with the former 
Security Service officers, who admitted that the documentation on the 
recruitment of operational contacts and clandestine collaborators in diplo-
matic posts could have been and had been in fact destroyed (e.g. “opera-
tional files”, “thematic files” on specific embassies). However, the sheer 
fact that the files were destroyed does not necessarily mean that it is now 
impossible to restore part of the information. Most probably, one would 
need to conduct a detailed analysis of the remaining records of “thematic 
files” (on the diplomatic posts) and/or “personal files” – which, unlike the 
“operational files” and “compound files”, were not destroyed (Cf. Zając, 
2006, pp. 21–36).
As regards the last case, it should be pointed out that on the territory 
of Poland there was the residency of the Soviet intelligence service, 
which on its own conducted operational games involving foreigners; 
thus, it cannot be ruled out that this might be the underlying cause for 
the lack of information on the recruitment of the diplomats in PRL. 
Similarly, it cannot be excluded that because of the co-operation of the 
Polish intelligence service with the Soviet one, the recruited clandestine 
collaborators were handed over to the Soviet services. Moreover, the 
Polish intelligence service recruited foreigners and diplomats outside 
the territory of Poland, e.g. through the activities under the cover of the 
“Unitra” company.
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Conclusion
The text analyses the intelligence activity against Poland in the pe-
riod 1944–1989. The paper also contains a case study, i.e. an analysis of 
the American intelligence service activity held against Poland. While ex-
amining the research thesis, the author used the documents and analyses 
prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to best illustrate the 
point, the author presented a number of cases of persons who spied for the 
USA, which was possible thanks to the analysis of the training materials 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directed to the officers of the Security 
Service and the Citizens’ Militia.
The text tackles the following issues: (1) To what extent did the 
character of the socio-political system influence the number of persons 
convicted for espionage against Poland in the period under examination 
(1944–1989)?; (2) What was the level of interest of the foreign intelli-
gence services in Poland before the year 1990?; (3) Is it possible to indi-
cate the specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland?
1) The analysis of data indicates that the period 1946–1956 witnessed 
a great number of convictions for espionage, which is often associated 
with the peculiar political situation in Poland of that time. Up to 1953, the 
countries of the Eastern bloc had reproduced the Stalin’s system, which 
only ceased due to the death of Stalin himself. Since then, the communist 
systems gradually transformed into the system of nomenklatura. Irrespec-
tive of these changes, Poland still witnessed a wave of repressions, which 
resulted from the threats continuously looming over the communist au-
thorities – combating the anti-communist underground movement, fight-
ing with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Polish government-in-exile, 
possible revisionism of borders, social discontent related to the socio-po-
litical reforms. Hence, a great number of convictions for espionage at that 
time could be ascribed to purely political sentences. Moreover, equally 
significant was the fact that the then judicial practice was preoccupied as-
sessing negatively any contacts and relations with foreigners. This exces-
sive number of convictions could ensue from other criminal-law provi-
sions, which applied with respect to the crimes against the State, including 
espionage. What is also important is the fact that in the Stalin’s period the 
judiciary personnel acquired their skills and qualifications through inten-
sive courses in law with the predominant spirit of the theory of evidence 
and law by Andrey Vyshinsky. Additionally, by the decree of 1944 the Pe-
nal Code of the Polish Armed Forces was introduced; the code envisaged 
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the increase in the number of offences classified as penalised with death 
penalty, whereas the high treason was subject to the military jurisdiction 
(the civilians were prosecuted in military courts till 1955; the espionage, 
however, still stood under the military jurisdiction). In 1946, there was 
introduced the Decree on particularly dangerous crimes in the period of 
the State’s recovery, which was later called a Small Penal Code.
2) The interest that foreign intelligence services expressed in relation 
to Poland was similar to the one they had in all countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe. In the case of Poland, it should be noted that foreign 
intelligence services recruited Polish citizens who had previously stayed 
abroad and after WWII returned to their home country. The services also 
gathered information from Poles staying in immigrant camps (e.g. in 
FRG). The activity of the American intelligence service on the territory 
of FRG and West Berlin played a key role. The documents of the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs pointed to the global range of this activity, e.g. 
through the recruitment of Polish sailors in the ports of the Netherlands, 
Japan, etc. In line with the development in the 1970s, espionage, which 
had so far concentrated on the defence and strategic sectors, became fo-
cused on science and technology of the People’s Republic of Poland. The 
acquisition of collaborators in academic circles was much easier, as PRL 
opened to academic exchange. Due to the system of visas, the process of 
candidate selection for intelligence services (e.g. the American) began in 
embassies. In the 1980s, the activity of the foreign intelligence services 
concentrated on the specific political situation in Poland, i.e. the growing 
significance of the “Solidarity” social movement.
3) The specificity of the American intelligence activity against Po-
land was related to the composition of the residency staff, which was 
the largest in comparison to other Western countries. The wide range of 
these activities can be proved by the quantitative data of convictions for 
espionage in the years 1944–1984 (however, one has to bear in mind the 
factors mentioned earlier in the text, which led to the misinterpretation of 
these data). Analysing the data and the documents prepared by the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs, one should treat them with caution, as, frequently, 
the Polish counter-intelligence service used to classify the ordinary dip-
lomatic practice and any contacts with foreigners as espionage threats. 
It is clearly visible in the language of the training materials concerned 
with “secret service methods of the intelligence activity” as well as in the 
documents on operational activities of the Security Service in relation to 
foreigners. The level of interest the USA had in Poland was mirrored in 
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the classification of diplomatic posts, according to which Warsaw occu-
pied the second place (the so-called Group “B”) on the three-point scale. 
The CIA experienced spectacular defeats during their activity in Poland: 
supporting the Polish underground anti-communist organisation Freedom 
and Independence and the so-called Munich-Berg episode (both cases 
took place in the 1950s).
The text focuses only on selected issues related to the espionage activ-
ities against Poland. Similarly, the analysis of the problem has been based 
on selected sources, which has limited the research scope – however, it 
was not the aim of the author to present the espionage activity against 
Poland in a comprehensive way. In order to assess the real threat posed by 
the espionage activity, one should analyse the case of persons convicted 
for espionage in the period 1944–1989, as the available quantitative data, 
mentioned in the text, cannot constitute an explicit benchmark for the 
scale of espionage activity. The inaccuracies in the interpretation of data 
and variables, which can affect the evaluation of this phenomenon, have 
been pointed out in the text.
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Działalność szpiegowska wobec Polski w dokumentach i analizach polskich 




Tekst omawia problem działalności szpiegowskiej wobec Polski w okresie 
1944–1989. Analiza ta została wzbogacana danymi ilościowymi z okresu 1944–1984 
w zakresie skazań za udział w obcym wywiadzie, działanie na jego rzecz oraz prze-
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kazywanie informacji. Problematykę szpiegostwa przedstawiono na przykładzie 
działalności USA, co zostało zobrazowane przykładami poszczególnych osób, które 
zostały skazane za działalność szpiegowską. W rozważeniu problemu badawczego 
posłużono się dokumentami i analizami opracowanymi przez Ministerstwo Spraw 
Wewnętrznych, głównie przeznaczonymi dla pracowników Służby Bezpieczeństwa 
i Milicji Obywatelskiej. W pracy podjęto się zweryfikowania następujących pytań ba-
dawczych: (1) W jakim stopniu charakter systemu społeczno-politycznego wpływał 
na liczbę skazań za szpiegostwo wobec Polski w analizowanym okresie 1944–1989?; 
(2) Jaki był poziom zainteresowania wywiadowczego obcych służb specjalnych Pol-
ską przed 1990 r.?; (3) Czy można wskazać na specyfikę działalności wywiadowczej 
USA przeciw Polsce?
 
Słowa kluczowe: szpiegostwo, szpiegostwo USA, działalność wywiadowcza, kontr-
wywiad, polski kontrwywiad, służby specjalne, bezpieczeństwo państwa

